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Not Another GMO  
Explaining Europe’s Approach to Nanotechnologies
Nico Jaspers
Abstract
Despite early warnings about “knowledge-enabled mass destruction” and the ongoing battle over agri-
cultural biotechnology, the development of nanotechnology in Europe has been remarkably quiet over 
the past decade: non-governmental organization (NGO) campaigns against “nano” were all but inexistent 
and the wider public appears largely uninterested in nanotechnology. Why has Europe’s experience with 
nanotechnologies been so fundamentally different from that with genetically modified organisms (GMOs)? 
This article argues that differences in the technologies as such cannot fully explain this divergence. Instead, 
a convergence of interests across key groups of stakeholders, the institutional evolution of the European 
Union (EU) and the experience from the GMO case enabled and facilitated a highly anticipatory and proac-
tive approach to nanotechnology risk governance. This approach, marked by early capacity building, stake-
holder involvement and gradual regulation succeeded in avoiding public polarization and in promoting a 
responsible development of nanotechnologies. 
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1. Introduction
Around the turn of the millennium, the emergence of nanotechnologies was accompanied by a series of 
hyperbolic statements that were reminiscent of the controversy over agricultural biotechnologies. Policy 
makers, scientists and a number of industry representatives portrayed nanotechnologies as the “next big 
thing” leading to a new era of socio-economic progress. Ray Kurzweil, a prominent futurologist, predicted 
that through nanotechnology, mankind can “overcome age-old problems, including pollution, poverty, dis-
ease, and aging” (Kurzweil 2003: 17). Mihail Roco, the architect of the US nanotechnology program, argued 
that nanotechnology will trigger the “next industrial revolution”, generate products worth one trillion dol-
lars and employ two million workers by 2015 (Roco/Bainbridge 2001). The European Parliament speculated 
that nanotechnology will enable mankind to “get rid of all the waste accumulated up to now” (European 
Parliament 2001: 16-17).
This enthusiasm was not universally shared and some commentators instead saw the possibility of self-rep-
licating nano-sized structures (“grey goo”) as a threat to the existence of mankind. Bill Joy, the co-founder 
of Sun Microsystems, argued that “superior competitors” to the human species would cause “knowledge-
enabled mass destruction” (Joy 2000: n.pag.) – a scenario that was vividly portrayed in Michael Crichton’s 
2002 New York Times bestseller Prey. Perhaps inspired by warnings that “proponents of nanotechnology 
are seeking new ways to control the rest of the earth” (ETC Group 1999: 43), a member of the Greens/
European Free Alliance, an environmentally-oriented collection of parties in the European Parliament, ar-
gued that “the most immediate priority is to prevent those who have the most to gain – big business – from 
beating the regulation race” (Cordis News 2003a: n.pag.).
Nanotechnologies combine a set of qualities that make them particularly vulnerable to public polarization. 
They enable the manipulation of matter at the molecular level and the production of materials with entirely 
new physical and chemical properties. These properties can be used to build, for instance, inexpensive wa-
ter purification systems, self-assembling organic solar cells, nano-encapsulated nutrients, high-efficiency 
fertilizers, artificial retinas, photothermal cancer therapy and other revolutionary applications. At the same 
time, the “invisible” technology comes with profound uncertainties about environmental, health and safety 
risks. Some nanotubes, for example, share important toxicological similarities with asbestos fibers and 
nanosilver has caused much concern over potential biocidal effects (ICON 2008). Other nanomaterials can 
enter the human body – an ability that also makes them interesting for medical applications – and migrate 
via the bloodstream to vital organs, including the brain. Some can enter cells, interact with their molecular 
structure and have cytotoxic or genotoxic effects. 
Beyond potential risks to human health and the environment, some stakeholders have expressed ethical 
concerns over the application of nanotechnologies for human enhancement and brain-to-brain or brain-
to-machine interfaces that blur the line between human and artificial life; the patenting of fundamental 
building blocks of life and the role of private corporations therein; and the use of nanotechnologies for 
military and surveillance purposes (e.g. Altmann 2004; Sandler 2009). Nanotechnologies are being devel-
oped in virtually every industrial sector and their most avid proponents come from the military-industrial 
complex, chemical multinationals, the pharmaceutical sector, cosmetic firms, the food and drink industry, 
information technology developers and a range of other global industries. Put succinctly, nanotechnologies 
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amalgamate tremendous commercial and societal potential with uncertain risks and ethical concerns, and 
thereby produce a regulatory terrain that is rapidly becoming a political minefield.
Considering the experience in Europe with GMOs, the hype and fear surrounding nanotechnologies ap-
peared set to cause a ferocious debate about the role of technology in society. Contrary to what one might 
have expected, however, the development of nanotechnologies in Europe over the past decade has been 
remarkably uncontroversial, has not caused much political polarization and is finding its way into an increas-
ing range of products without much public concern. Media reports about nanotechnology risks are few and 
far between; civil society and NGOs have largely refrained from campaigning against nanotechnologies and 
often engaged with industry and regulators on a constructive and technical level; Member State initiatives 
to “regulate nano” are all but inexistent; less than half of Europeans know what nanotechnologies are and 
only a small fraction of the public is aware of risks (Gaskell et al. 2010); and industry representatives appear 
to accept – though perhaps not always support – a proactive regulatory approach.
Why has the development of nanotechnologies been so remarkably quiet and why has nano not become 
Europe’s “new GMO”? This article explores the development of nanotechnologies in Europe over the past 
decade and argues that a convergence of interests across key groups of stakeholders, the institutional 
evolution of the EU and the learning from the GMO case enabled the European Union – in particular the 
European Commission – to follow a remarkably proactive and anticipatory approach to risk governance 
that avoided the intricate choice between an overly precautionary and an overly reactive approach to 
technology risks under uncertainty. Due to the novelty of the issue and the still emerging research area of 
anticipatory risk governance under uncertainty, this paper is exploratory in nature and seeks to introduce 
the subject of nanotechnology risk management to a wider audience in the public policy arena. Since theo-
retical frameworks on risk regulation are often driven by practical experience rather than the other way 
around, this article seeks to investigate whether and in what form Europe’s experience with nanotechnol-
ogy provides new insights into our understanding of risk governance approaches.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The second section explores similarities between 
agricultural biotechnology and nanotechnologies in their potential to incite public concern. It argues that 
scientific differences cannot explain the different trajectories of GMOs and nanotechnologies. The third 
section turns to the past decade of nanotechnology policy in Europe and outlines key events related to 
agenda setting, information gathering and decision-making processes over that time. Based on this empiri-
cal insight, the fourth section then extracts the causal mechanisms behind Europe’s nanotechnology policy. 
It explains how the institutional evolution of the EU, a convergence of interests among stakeholders and 
learning processes among key actors enabled the European Commission, jointly with other institutions, to 
follow a risk governance strategy marked by foresight, capacity building and gradualism that in retrospect 
turned out to be a rather successful example of how to manage risk under uncertainty. Section five pro-
vides some concluding remarks.
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2. Frankenfoods and Grey Goo: Why Nano could have been another GMO
From a scientific point of view, the ability to genetically modify organisms and the ability to manipulate 
matter at the nanoscale have little in common beyond the fact that both are revolutionary new technolo-
gies. From a public policy point of view, however, nanotechnologies and green biotechnology share some 
important features. This section discusses these similarities and argues that the scientific and technological 
differences between agricultural biotechnology and nanotechnologies as such cannot fully explain why the 
former has attracted so much public controversy but not the latter. The section discusses four key areas 
of similarity: scientific uncertainty and technical complexity; ethical concerns; risk-benefit relations; and 
industry structures and interests.
Scientific Uncertainty
Scientific uncertainty about risk is among the most widely cited circumstances for the EU’s decision to im-
pose a de facto memorandum on the approval of GMOs in the late 1990s (Myhr/Traavik 2002). Uncertainty 
about whether GMOs can transfer their genetic material to other organisms, whether GMOs introduce 
new pathogens into the natural environment and whether potential unintended consequences can be 
controlled led to considerable public concern – fomented by campaigns from NGOs and green parties – and 
pressured the EU to act precautionary (Van Asselt/Vos 2008).
Scientific uncertainty surrounding nanotechnology risk in many ways exceeds uncertainty on GMO safety. 
It also increasingly resembles a Hydra-like creature where answering one question often produces more 
uncertainty than it solves. The discovery that the particular shape and length of a nanotube can affect its 
toxicity, for instance, has led researchers to wonder whether this is only true for multi-walled, carbon-
based tubes or also for single-walled, metal-based ones. Similarly, the fact that different nanomaterials can 
agglomerate and change over their life-cycle led researchers to wonder whether and how the toxicological 
profile of incidental new composites develops over time. The adequacy of protective equipments, poten-
tial exposure scenarios, the translocation of particles within the human body and the accuracy of measure-
ment and detection instruments, among others, provide further sources of uncertainty.1
Ethical Concern
A second rationale for precautionary risk management on green biotechnology relates to ethical concerns 
over tinkering with the building blocks of life (Wynne 2001). Terms such as “Frankenfoods” have stigma-
tized GMOs as a frightening and uncontrollable technology in a sector that has experienced a history of 
scares, ranging from the use of growth hormones in beef production to the BSE scandal, various instances 
of salmonella and dioxin contaminations and avian flu (see e.g. Knowles et al. 2007). 
1 A recent overview of the state of research on nanomaterial (eco)toxicology is provided by EASAC and JRC (2011).
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Nanotechnologies have an equally emotionally-charged history, albeit not in terms of concrete scares but as 
a result of science fiction stories. Already in 1986, Eric Drexler envisioned an end-of-world scenario where 
self-replicating microscopic robots produce “grey goo” that consumes all matter on earth and threatens 
the existence of mankind (Drexler 1986). Such concerns found resonance in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
most notably in the prediction that “superior competitors” to the human species could cause “knowledge-
enabled mass destruction” (Joy 2000: n.pag.). Nanotechnologies in the late 1990s provided ample room for 
ethical concern and emotionally-charged scenarios about uncontrollable risks. Perceived as an “invisible” 
technology, it is difficult to understand but can have profound implications on everyday life and involves 
the restructuring of the world from the bottom up. 
Risk-Benefit Relations
A third potential explanation for European policies on GMOs relates to the notion – often put forth in cam-
paigns by environmental groups – that the expected benefits of agricultural biotechnology do not justify 
its potential risks. Considering the degree of uncertainty involved with estimating the long-term effects of 
new technologies, it is usually difficult to either prove or disprove such claims conclusively. However, hav-
ing been portrayed as no less than a struggle between world salvation and world destruction, nanotech-
nologies provide considerable room for inflated perceptions of both risk and benefits and thus easily lend 
themselves to similar narratives as was the case with green biotechnology.
Industry Structure
Finally, another widely-cited source for Europe’s skepticism towards GMOs relates to the somewhat pe-
culiar structure of the GMO industry, which throughout the 1990s was dominated by only a handful of 
multinationals with Monsanto, a US chemical company and seed producer, at the forefront. The image of 
a US conglomerate that uses aggressive business practices, political connections and intensive lobbying to 
force the adoption of a controversial technology upon European farmers provided a formidable campaign 
tool for a collection of environmental activists and critics of globalization. Nanotechnology’s most avid de-
velopers can be found within the military-industrial complex, chemical multinationals, the pharmaceutical 
sector, cosmetic firms and the food and drink industry – sectors that have attracted a fair share of public 
criticism over the past decades. The “nanotechnology industry” is thus equally vulnerable to caricature and 
public opposition. 
In sum, as much as green biotechnology and nanotechnologies differ from a scientific point of view, they 
share many aspects from a public policy point of view: considerable scientific uncertainty about the nature 
and extent of risks; the potential of apocalyptic scenarios to trigger public polarization; the scope for hy-
perbolic and distortionary depictions of ethical risks and benefits; and an industry structure experienced 
with public controversy and NGO campaigning. It is difficult to explain why the development of green bio-
technology and nanotechnologies has been so markedly different merely by considering the technologies 
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themselves. Instead, a deeper look at the political environment of nanotechnology development over the 
past decade in Europe is needed. 
3. Nanotechnology in Europe: Three Phases of Policy Development
This section provides an overview of nanotechnology policy and development in Europe over the past 
decade, divided into three phases: the agenda-setting phase, the information gathering phase and the 
decision-making phase. These different phases, loosely derived from standard policy-cycle models (e.g. 
Anderson 1975), describe leading themes at each stage of policy development but do not represent a sharp 
and definite categorization of policy steps.
The Agenda-Setting Phase
During the first phase of nanotechnology policy, from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, nanotechnologies 
were just emerging from the laboratories in Europe and applications were mostly still in experimental form. 
Few nano-enabled products existed aside from the odd application in electronics and sunscreens. Patents 
had yet to be turned into products on a notable scale, public awareness of nanotechnology was low and 
concern about nano risks was virtually nonexistent among the wider public. Outside the science and tech-
nology promotion bodies at the European level and at Member State level, few policy makers were familiar 
with nanotechnologies. Yet, this relative calm belied a flurry of activity by the European Union, Member 
States and civil society organizations.
At the turn of the millennium, the EU decided to become a key player in nanotechnology research and 
development. It increased its funding on nanotechnologies from about €45 million per year between 1998 
and 2002 to a total of €1.3 billion between 2002 and 2006. It framed this investment as a strategic move 
to strengthen European competitiveness under the “Lisbon Agenda” and as part of an effort to establish 
a “European Research Area” (European Commission 2002). Shortly after it was established as a strategic 
policy area, however, nanotechnology development started to attract controversy.
The European Parliament set the stage in early 2003 with a gathering where Caroline Lucas, a member 
of the European Parliament from the British Green Party, worried that “innovation is running ahead of 
regulation” (Cordis News 2003a: n.pag.). This claim was echoed by participants calling for a moratorium 
on nanotechnology research and use. As much as a moratorium frightened researchers and industry, fears 
about nanotechnology safety were not entirely unfounded. Soon after the meeting, Greenpeace published 
a report that described how nanoparticles might be able to penetrate living cells and accumulate in organs, 
and that nanotubes and asbestos fibers might share some important structural similarities (Arnall 2003).
In Member States, different institutions became interested in nanomaterial safety as well. The German 
Parliament’s Office of Technology Assessment (TAB) in 2003 also highlighted potential health effects of 
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nanotubes that resemble asbestos fibers; called for more research on the societal effects of nanotechnolo-
gies; criticized the state of knowledge on environmental and health effects of nanotechnologies; called for 
a review of regulatory frameworks for nanotechnologies and for a program to “monitor” applications of 
nanotechnologies for regulatory purposes; and criticized that uncertainty on environment and health risks 
may inhibit the successful commercialization of nanotechnologies (Paschen et al. 2003). These claims were 
echoed by other institutions, including the German Association of Engineers (VDI) (Luther 2004), the UK 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (Aitken at al. 2004: vi) and the insurance company Swiss Re (Hett 2004).
In June 2003, the United Kingdom (UK) Government asked the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of 
Engineering (RS&RAE) to take a closer look at nanotechnology risks and the potential regulatory implica-
tions. Ann Dowling, the chair of the RS&RAE working group argued that, “[i]t is important that we get the 
regulation of nanotechnology right while the field is still in its infancy” (Dowling 2003: n.pag.). The result-
ing report marked a watershed in the debate. It dismissed concerns about self-replicating nanobots and 
instead systematically described possible adverse impacts of nanotechnologies on human health and the 
environment when nanomaterials cross the blood-brain barrier and other natural defense mechanisms of 
the human body in the skin, gut and lungs. The report concluded that nanoparticles should be treated “as 
if they were hazardous” and should be regulated as new substances (RS&RAE 2004: 71).
Amidst this concerted effort to push nanomaterial safety on the agenda, Renzo Tomellini, the head of the 
Commission’s nanotechnology promotion program, worried that nanotechnologies have become a “show 
piece” for expectations and hopes but also for “polemics and fears” (Cordis News 2003b). As one of the 
largest investors in nanotechnologies, the Commission had much to lose from a repeat of the GMO saga and 
responded quickly to emerging concerns. In 2004, it promised a “timely” regulation of nanotechnologies, 
a “re-examination and possible revision” of existing legislation, and a “global agreement on base principles 
for the responsible development of nanotechnologies” (European Commission 2004a: 23). The Health and 
Consumers directorate also entered the fray and asked experts about their opinion on nanomaterial safety. 
The response was that “some engineered nanoparticles […] may have the potential to pose serious con-
cerns” (European Commission 2004b: 11); that nanotoxicity cannot be derived or predicted from known 
toxicity of bulk materials; that a new Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) registry number should be assigned 
to manufactured nanoparticles; that institutions to monitor nanotechnologies should be established; and 
that existing regulations should be revised whenever appropriate.
Within merely three years, nanotechnologies were transformed from an obscure issue into a matter of 
strategic importance, and nanomaterial safety was turned from an esoteric science fiction scenario into a 
new field of (eco)toxicology that was subject to considerable regulatory scrutiny.
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The Information-Gathering Phase
The broad agenda for nanotechnology development in Europe was set by around 2004: Risks and regula-
tory questions have to be taken seriously to turn nanotechnologies into a success. The subsequent phase 
in nanotechnology policy thus focused on the question of what exactly those risks were and what the 
regulatory consequences of these risks could be. The European Commission rapidly established itself as 
the key actor on these questions. In 2005, it published an “action plan” in which it called for a “code of 
conduct” for the responsible development and use of nanotechnology and reiterated the need for more 
international cooperation, especially in nomenclature, metrology, common approaches to risk assessment 
and the creation of a database to share toxicological and ecotoxicological as well as epidemiological data 
(European Commission 2005; Tomellini/Villepin 2005).
To implement this strategy, the Commission started a four-year “Nanosafe 2” project to develop risk as-
sessment and risk management methodologies for a safe development of nanotechnologies in 2005. The 
Commission’s Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR) also commented on 
nanotechnology safety and in 2006 argued that existing (eco)toxicological methods may not be adequate 
to assess risks related to nanoparticles. It further criticized uncertainties with regard to regulatory require-
ments, in particular guidelines, for risk assessment, and the focus on mass instead of particle size in existing 
regulations (SCENIHR 2006). Later, however, SCENIHR added that, “the selection of the size limits associ-
ated with the prefix ‘nano’ […] is somewhat arbitrary” and that specific size ranges do not automatically 
imply greater toxicological, public health or environmental health concern (SCENIHR 2007: 3). Echoing 
the warnings by SCENIHR, the Commission’s Scientific Committee on Consumer Products (SCCP) argued 
that for insoluble nanoparticles, conventional risk assessment methodologies may not be adequate (SCCP 
2007).
In addition to better understanding the nature of uncertainty, the Commission started to fund civil society 
capacity building projects, including “Decide”, to conduct and facilitate deliberative democracy debates on 
nanotechnology policy; “Deepen”, to address ethical issues in nanotechnologies and to engage civil society 
in relevant debates; “Messenger”, to support informed debate between scientists, journalists and civil 
society that are involved in producing media coverage of nanotechnology-related risks; “Nanobioraise”, to 
combine ethics research in nanobiotechnology with science communication; “Nanocap”, to built relevant 
capacities at NGOs; “Nanodialogue”, to raise public awareness of latest developments in nanotechnologies 
and to inform the Commission about societal concerns; “Nanologue”, to encourage multistakeholder dia-
logue on social, ethical and legal aspects of nanotechnologies; and “Path”, to foster participatory processes 
in science and technology policy (Hullmann 2008).
Amidst these activities, civil society organizations also became more involved with nanotechnology safety. 
The Alliance of Social and Ecological Consumer Organisations (ASECO) in 2006 called for the application of 
the “precautionary principle”, labeling provisions and a revision of EU regulatory frameworks “in parallel 
with science and experience” (ASECO 2006: 4). Vivagora, an NGO that organized debates on scientific and 
technological innovations, started to organize a series of public debates in France on the role of nanotech-
nologies in society. In 2007, the UK’s Soil Association, an environmental NGO that certifies organic food, 
announced that it has developed a standard that bans nanoparticles from organic food (Smithers 2008). 
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The UK consumer organization “Which?” also organized a citizen’s panel, which was generally in favor of 
further developing nanotechnologies but stressed the importance of consumer choice and the labeling of 
nano-enabled products (Which? 2007). These engagements, however, were accompanied by relatively low 
public interest in the debate with less than half of Europeans having heard about nanotechnology (Gaskell 
et al. 2006).
In Member States, different institutions expanded their activities on nanotechnologies. The UK’s Institute 
of Food Science and Technology (IFST) proposed a labeling scheme for nanomaterials in food (IFST 2006); 
the UK’s Food Standards Agency (FSA) identified gaps and uncertainties in EU food and feed legislation (FSA 
2006); the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) launched a voluntary reporting 
program for industry (DEFRA 2006); and the German Federal Institute of Risk Assessment (BfR), the Federal 
Environment Agency (UBA) and the Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BAuA) proposed 
research strategies to assess the environmental and health risks of nanoparticles (Orthen et al. 2007).
The BAuA also collaborated with the German Chemical Industry Association (VCI) to develop guidance 
documents on safe handling and use of nanomaterials (BAuA/VCI 2007). In 2006, Germany also started 
the “NanoCare”, “Tracer” and “INOS” projects to establish a scientific foundation for nanomaterial safety 
assessment (NanoCare), characterization of CNTs (Tracer) and developing in-vitro test methods (INOS). In 
2006, the French Agency for Environmental and Occupational Health Safety (AFSSET) recommended that 
the EU should work towards a global harmonization of nanotechnology-related regulation (AFSSET 2006). 
Subsequently, the National Center for Scientific Research began looking at nanomaterials risks (CNRS 
2007).
Meanwhile, members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from the Greens/European Free Alliance unsuc-
cessfully sought to change the chemical regulation REACH to treat all nanomaterials as substances of very 
high concern and to require elaborate safety assessments and complex authorization procedures due to 
the “very worrying adverse effects by nanoparticles” (European Parliament 2006a: 55). This request came 
amidst a statement by the German Federal Environment Agency (UBA) that “gaps in the statutory treat-
ment of nanomaterials exist […] with regard to REACH, where it is particularly questionable whether the 
quantity thresholds necessary to trigger registration will be attained […]” (Führ et al. 2006: 25); and amidst 
a statement by the European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE) that the 
Commission and the Council should “remove any roadblocks in the form of lack of standards and unclear 
legislation” that hinder the successful development of nanotechnologies in Europe (European Parliament 
2006b: 5).
The “nanotechnology industry” kept a relatively low-key profile during these debates. The CIAA2, a European 
food and drinks industry association, asked EFSA to evaluate the safety of titanium nitrate nanoparticles 
for use as an additive in PET packaging and EFSA found no risk for such applications (EFSA 2008). The 
chemical industry strongly favored using the yet-to-be implemented new chemical regulation, REACH, to 
cover nanomaterials. It argued that instead of discussing a new “nano regulation”, efforts should focus 
2 The Confédération des Industries Agro-Alimentaires de l‘UE (CIAA) changed its name to “FoodDrinkEurope” in June 
2011.
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on definitions, safety research, test guidelines and protocols. Overall, industry actors appeared reluctant 
to question the need for regulatory policy and instead highlighted the importance of gradually creating 
meaningful regulatory frameworks that do not hinder innovation and product commercialization. Official 
statements by industry representatives during this period were few and far between, but EU officials cap-
tured what many companies thought: “Uncertainties by the general public about health, safety and envi-
ronmental effects can restrict available capital and prevent companies from launching products involving 
nanotechnologies” (European Parliament 2006b: 10). Or, as Janez Potocnik, the former Commissioner for 
science and research, argued:
“If the full potential of nanoscience is to be exploited, […] public concerns must be taken into account, 
whether or not they are believed to be justified. If Europe does not address problems early on, they will 
come back later with more force.” (Cordis News 2006)
This assessment of the situation was a consensus shared across the different branches of the Commission. 
The Commissioner for Industry, for instance, argued that a “reliable and stable regulatory framework” could 
be a tool to increase competitiveness; the Commissioner for the Environment highlighted the “regulatory 
challenge” of “ensuring a high level of protection of health, safety and the environment”; the Commissioner 
for Health and Consumers stressed the importance of stakeholder involvement; and the Commissioner for 
Employment and Social Affairs stated that “we must make sure that any potential risks to workers’ health 
and safety are properly addressed” (European Commission 2008b: n.pag.).
Seeking to follow a proactive approach without hastening into changing regulations prematurely, the 
Commission in 2008 decided that, “current legislation covers to a large extent risks in relation to nano-
materials [… but] may have to be modified in the light of new information becoming available” (European 
Commission 2008a: 3). It also published a Code of Conduct to address the safe handling of nanomaterials in 
basic research (European Commission 2008c) and reviewed the regulatory coverage for nanomaterials in a 
range of legislative areas, including chemicals and worker protection; agicultural, medicinal and consumer 
products; and environmental protection. It concluded that this legislation could be implemented with re-
gard to nanomaterials by the
“[...] setting of thresholds, authorisation of substances and ingredients, qualifying waste as hazard-
ous, reinforcing conformity assessment by reclassification, introducing restrictions on the marketing 
and use of chemical substances and preparations, etc. through ‘Comitology’ procedures.” (European 
Commission 2008a: 9)
By the end of the second phase, the European Commission established itself as the dominant actor on 
nanotechnology policy. It was the largest investor in nanotechnology research and development, guardian 
of regulatory policy and a key funding body for risk assessment.
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The Decision-Making Phase
After a relatively calm debate between 2004 and 2008, the third phase of nanotechnology policy became 
more controversial as the ongoing risk assessment projects produced some worrying results. In 2009, 
SCENIHR argued that proper risk assessment suffers from limited knowledge on methodologies for expo-
sure estimations and hazard identification (SCENIHR 2009). At the same time, EFSA claimed that relevant 
data for risk assessment are “extremely limited” and “any individual risk assessment is likely to be subject to 
a high degree of uncertainty” (EFSA 2009: 2). A year later, the UK’s House of Lords Science and Technology 
Committee argued that there are “certain ‘grey areas’ where products containing nanomaterials may slip 
through the regulatory net” and that “due to the large gaps in the scientific understanding of nanomateri-
als, it was not yet possible to assess properly their safety in many cases” (House of Lords 2010: 6).
In light of these findings, civil society organizations became increasingly vocal. Friends of the Earth called 
for a moratorium on the use of nanomaterials in the food sector until “nanotechnology-specific safety laws 
are established and the public is involved in decision making” (Miller/Senjen 2008: 3). Similar demands 
were voiced by the Dutch Society for Nature and Environment and other Dutch environmental and con-
sumer organizations (Nanoforum 2008a; Nanoforum 2008b). The European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) called for the closing of “several loopholes” in relevant EU legislation and “proper legislation” for 
nanotechnologies (ETUC 2009: n.pag.). The European Environmental Bureau (EEB), a federation of environ-
mental organizations, wanted a “strict regulatory framework” and a “pre-market registration and approval 
framework” (ETUC 2009: n.pag.).
Other NGOs, including Aseco, the Soil Association and Greenpeace, called for precautionary approaches, 
the labeling of consumer products, mandatory pre-market safety assessments and a revision or signifi-
cant amendment of existing regulatory frameworks (EurActiv 2009b). In Grenoble, France, opponents of 
nanotechnologies made it impossible to hold a debate on nanotechnology and society (Nanoforum 2009) 
and the Special Commission for Public Debate (CPDP) had to cancel similar debates after interruptions by 
protesters who argued that “nano” is “totalitarian” (McAlpine 2010).
In part to counter such polarization, the European chemical industry association CEFIC started a “nano 
dialogue” on nanomaterial risk with different stakeholders in 2008 to “avoid confusion or misunderstand-
ing, due to situations where people make judgements based on limited information” (Malsch 2008: n.pag.). 
The highest ranking health official at the Commission, Robert Madelin, meanwhile criticized the use of 
“panic” by some civil society organizations to attract attention as irresponsible and expressed his frustra-
tion with conflicting messages from industry and civil society (EurActiv 2009a). He further argued that part 
of the consumer movement does not have adequate expertise in the area of nanotechnology to support 
honest debate (EurActiv 2009a). At the same time, he also tried to encourage retailers to more fully engage 
with the public to better explain the risks and benefits of nanotechnology applications – a request that was 
met with skepticism by retailers (EurActiv 2010).
A somewhat fragmented position towards nanotechnology policy across the industry became more ap-
parent after 2008. Some industry representatives, for instance, saw the Commission’s Code of Conduct as 
an “effective hybrid regulation mechanism”, while others argued that it is “totally unnecessary” (European 
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Commission 2009b: 5). Industry representatives also appeared to firmly favor the adaptation of existing leg-
islation over specific “nanotechnology legislation” (O’Hagan 2007). However, a survey by the Commission 
showed that a majority of industry representatives were favorably disposed towards a new nano regu-
lation and only 30 percent were strictly against it. The survey also showed that almost half of industry 
representatives was favorably disposed to consumer labeling provisions (less than 15 percent opposed) 
(European Commission 2010).3 The chemical industry clearly did not share this view and reiterated its 
opposition to labeling schemes and nano-specific regulations, and instead worried about loopholes in 
the implementation of chemical regulations for importers who “in several cases do not meet the correct 
standards” (EurActiv 2009c: n.pag.).
Amidst uncertainty about safety, greater involvement of civil society and unclear preferences of industry, 
the European Parliament stepped in and adopted a resolution in 2009 in which it “deplores the absence 
of a proper evaluation of the de facto application of the general provisions of Community law”; requests 
the Commission to carry out another review of legislation; and calls for the labeling of nanomaterials in 
consumer products and “stringent ethical guidelines” (European Parliament 2009: n.pag.). The resolution 
was based on a report by Carl Schlyter, a Swedish Green MEP (Schlyter 2009), who saw his work as “more 
than a wake-up call for the Commission and the chemical industry” (EurActiv 2009d: n.pag.).
Following this resolution, the Parliament started to systematically introduce nano-specific regulatory 
amendments. In March 2009, it approved the recast of the EU cosmetics legislation, which created report-
ing requirements for users of insoluble nanomaterials and mandates the labeling of such materials for 
cosmetic products (European Commission 2009a: 65) – a move that was widely applauded by NGOs but 
opposed by Germany who worried that labeling “might be misunderstood by consumers as a warning” 
(European Council 2009: 2). It was murmured that the cosmetics industry ultimately accepted the labeling 
provision in order to avoid more extensive pre-market authorization requirement.
The Parliament also planned to introduce nano-specific language and risk assessment requirements for bio-
cidal products (European Parliament 2010b) and electronic equipment. In the latter case, the Parliament’s 
environment committee (ENVI) proposed to ban the use of nanosilver and carbon nanotubes in electrical 
and electronic equipment as it deemed the use of nanosilver in such equipment “superfluous” and argued 
that carbon nanotubes “can have asbestos-like properties” (European Parliament 2010a: 98). An attempt 
by ENVI to ban foods produced by nanotechnology processes “until they have undergone specific and ad-
equate risk assessments” (European Parliament 2010c: n.pag.) was rejected by the Commission (European 
Commission 2009c) and the European Council (2010).
The pace of these changes caught some observers by surprise. The scope of the new tools introduced 
or proposed – from labeling requirements to authorizations, bans, product registers and others – pro-
vided the Commission with extensive authority to delay or restrict the marketing of certain products. The 
Commission meanwhile, partly in reaction to the Parliament’s activities, started to follow a more proactive 
approach. The European Chemical Agency (ECHA) announced a reconsideration of how nanomaterials are 
3 It should be mentioned though that the survey relied on the self-identification of stakeholder groups so that the 
correct interpretation of the preferences of each group depends on accurate self-identification.
16 | KFG Working Paper No. 44| September 2012 
regulated in mid-2009 and ECHA Executive Director Geert Dancet argued that a review of REACH’s cover-
age of nanomaterials will be conducted and that this will lead to “nanomaterials [being] covered in a more 
systematic way” after 2012 (Breggin et al. 2011: 228).
Some Member States also started to become more active. In late 2010, the Belgian EU Presidency proposed 
mandatory consumer labeling of nanotechnologies and a register for nanomaterials under the REACH 
regulation (EurActiv 2010). Not wanting to wait for European action, the French government adopted a 
new set of environmental legislation, the “Grenelle II Act”, in June 2010, which stipulated a mandatory 
reporting requirement for “nanoparticulate substances” (OECD 2010: 30-31). In Germany, the Green Party 
introduced a law into their national Parliament that would ban all consumer products using nanosilver 
(Maisch et al. 2010).
The recall of a nanotechnology-based pump spray called “NanoCover” caused some controversy and media 
reporting in 2010. The Danish authorities ordered the recall of the German product, arguing that it contains 
a chemical – trioxytridecafloursilane – that is toxic when inhaled (Rapex 2010). Similar to an earlier product 
recall in Germany for a nanotechnology-based glass and ceramic surface ceiling product, however, the 
identified risk appeared not to be directly related to nano-specific properties, but rather to the chemical 
identities of the product’s ingredients (NIA 2010).
In part as a response to such events, a former official from the Commission’s industry directorate argued 
that since the Commission has created considerable “hype” around the benefits of nanotechnologies, it 
must now also facilitate the commercialization of nanoapplications on the market. The development of 
strict but well-defined regulatory frameworks can contribute to securing public trust and thus increase the 
acceptance of nanoproducts (Brekelmans 2011).
The pressure on the Commission to find appropriate regulatory responses to nanomaterial risks amidst 
considerable uncertainty about whether a one-size-fits-all is feasible culminated in the dilemma of finding 
an appropriate legal definition for nanomaterials. In 2010, SCENIHR argued that there is “an urgent need to 
identify by clear unequivocal descriptions what can be considered as a nanomaterial” (SCENIHR 2010: 4). 
When attempting to do so, however, it ended up with a cumbersome 46-page discussion of what a defini-
tion should and should not entail, with the conclusion that even this elaborate discussion may need to be 
adapted to, “specific circumstances regarding risk assessment for regulatory purposes for certain areas and 
applications […]” (SCENIHR 2010: 4).
The development of nanotechnologies in Europe over the past decade has been accompanied by a remark-
able degree of activities at a technical level from regulators, scientists, academics, legal experts, industry 
associations, civil society and other stakeholders. Europe rapidly proceeded from acknowledging the im-
portance of risks to creating the necessary capacities to understand these risks, and from acknowledging 
the importance of regulatory policy to better understanding how meaningful regulations can be designed 
and implemented. All the while, nanotechnology applications were developed with relatively little political 
polarization and public concern.
                            Not Another GMO  | 17
4. Explaining Europe’s Nanotechnology Policy
This section synthesizes the three key factors that shaped Europe’s nanotechnology policy: the institutional 
evolution of the EU, the convergence of interests among actors and learning processes both within the 
Commission and by external stakeholders.4 While these factors are discussed separately in the following, 
they are closely interrelated. The institutional evolution of the EU with respect to risk assessment and risk 
management approaches, for instance, is both a cause and consequence of learning processes, which in 
turn affect stakeholder preferences and interests.
The Institutional Evolution of the EU
As a political entity, the European Union experiences a constant process of structural and constitutional 
evolution. In the context of risk management practices, three developments are particularly notable: the 
EU’s expanding role as a funding body for research and development, the expansion in risk assessment 
capacities and the linking of such capacities to regulatory policy and the ongoing revision of relevant legis-
lation and the recast of directives into proper regulations.
Until the late 1990s, the EU was an important funding body for scientific research, but activities in Member 
States still dominated this policy area. With the goal to turn the EU into the “the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010” as part of the Lisbon Agenda (European Council 2000: 
n.pag) and the related increase in funding for primary research and development as part of the European 
Research Area, the EU became an increasingly autonomous actor in promoting scientific and technological 
development. This had three implications: First, nanotechnology development became a very concrete 
strategic issue to the EU and in particular to the European Commission’s Research Directorate; second, 
the Commission increased its scientific capacity considerably; and third, the EU itself gained a stake in the 
successful development of nanotechnologies. Together, these factors implied that the importance of nano-
technologies for the EU as a political entity was significantly larger than was the case with earlier technolo-
gies including biotechnology. The Commission increased its planned investments in nanotechnology from 
about €45 million per year between 1998 and 2002 to €3.5 billion between 2007 and 2013, which turned 
the Commission into the world’s largest funding body for nanotechnology research and development.
Over the past decade, the EU also underwent a small revolution in terms of risk assessment structures and 
capacities, in part driven by the controversy surrounding the regulation of GMOs. In 2002, it established 
the European Food Safety Authority, reformed the structure of its risk assessment activities and estab-
lished three new scientific committees: the SCCP to assess the safety of consumer products; the Scientific 
Committee on Health and Environmental Risks (SCHER) to assess health and environmental risks; and the 
SCENIHR to assess emerging and newly identified risks. These changes were accompanied by a seeming 
4 This section focuses on the empirics of how these factors shaped nanotechnology policy. There exists a vast and 
rapidly expanding literature on the theory of European institutional change (e.g. Béland 2009; Naurin/Rasmussen 
2011), interest-based EU policy explanations (e.g. Knodt et al. 2011) and learning processes in the EU (e.g. Montpetit 
2009; Kerber/Eckhardt 2007).
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realignment of environmental and health policy away from a focus on precaution under uncertainty and 
more towards the active production of knowledge and information for regulatory purposes. The symbol of 
this change was the REACH regulation, which was first proposed in 2001 with a draft legislative proposal 
emerging in 2003. REACH was a revolution in chemicals regulation for it systematically mandated the regis-
tration and possible evaluation of chemical substances before they are marketed (see also EurActiv 2003). 
It has often been described as the largest and most important single piece of legislation the EU has ever 
enacted.
Finally, as part of the EU’s mission to harmonize environment, health and safety (EHS) legislation across 
Member States if asymmetries impede the proper functioning of the common market, the EU also under-
went a process of revising, updating and formalizing legislative recommendations, directives and regula-
tions. This process enabled a proactive yet gradual approach to nanomaterial regulation as no new “nano 
law” would have to be constructed in order to slowly but steadily extend the regulatory coverage of nano-
materials. The most prominent examples of this process were the development of the REACH regulation, 
the recast of the cosmetics directive into a proper regulation, as well as the ongoing revision of food, waste, 
biocidal products and other regulations. In all these cases, the legislative barriers to adding nano-specific 
clauses to the final document were relatively low and turned the regulatory process into a somewhat ob-
scure and technocratic piecemeal procedure that was difficult to comprehend for a casual observer.
Combined, these factors provided both the incentives and opportunity structures to (a) shift the agenda 
setting role in regulatory policy further away from individual Member States towards the European 
Commission and Parliament, (b) create the capacities to coordinate and conduct risk assessment at the 
European level and with a direct link to regulatory questions, and (c) open legislative room for a gradual 
and cautious yet targeted and effective regulatory process.
Learning Processes
It is difficult to conclusively prove learning processes of key actors, but statements by officials and other 
stakeholders as well as the overall nature of the debate suggest that the experiences with agricultural 
biotechnologies had a profound impact on the direction of nanotechnology policy. Some scholars have 
suggested that the de facto moratorium on GMOs in the EU was an outcome of a coordination failure at 
the European level (e.g. Falkner 2007) and a “ratcheting-up” effect whereby European policy would follow 
the most stringent national regulations (Bernauer 2003). Such dynamics undermined the Commission’s 
ability to develop policy proposals and work towards a consensus with the Parliament and the Council. 
Considering the interest of the European Commission in promoting a successful development of nanotech-
nologies and its responsibility as the primary architect and harmonizer of EHS regulations, the proactive 
step to re-examine and possibly revise existing legislation with regard to nanotechnologies as well as the 
promise of timely regulation can be interpreted as an attempt to forestall activities at the level of Member 
States and thus maintain the ability to set the agenda. Ann Dowling’s call for getting the “regulation of 
nanotechnology right while the field is still in its infancy” (Dowling 2003: n.pag.) can certainly be inter-
preted in a similar way.
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The relatively rapid focus on risk assessment, both at the level of Member States and at the European 
level, can be interpreted as a second instance of learning. Amidst calls in the European Parliament to 
adopt precautionary measures and the controversial role that the precautionary principle has played in the 
regulation of GMOs, there seemed to be a coordinated effort to better understand the nature and extent 
of uncertainty, especially with regard to rather speculative ethical concerns about “grey goo”. Between 
2003 and around 2007, there was a notable shift in the debate on nanotechnology safety away from the 
question of whether to apply precaution amidst uncertainty towards the question of how best to reduce 
uncertainty, including through regulatory means.
A third and final instance of learning appears to be the approach of European and Member State bodies 
as well as industry organizations towards civil society. Between 2001 and 2012, the European Commission 
spent almost €19 million to fund projects related to ethical, legal, social and governance aspects of nano-
technologies (Hullmann 2008) and engaged in extensive capacity building program for NGOs (see above). 
Industry organizations also organized stakeholder dialogues and participated in the dialogues and work-
shops that were organized by the EU. The call for more engagement with civil society and NGOs can be 
found in almost any EU and Member State document on nanotechnology policy. It is difficult to ascertain 
whether these activities had a lasting impact on the nature of decision-making and the de facto influence 
of civil society, but it nevertheless signifies a high degree of willingness to involve civil society, if only to 
influence their stance and keep track of their activities.
Convergence of Interests
It would certainly be misleading to portray nanotechnology policy in Europe as the result of a sudden 
collaboration between different groups of stakeholders who share common goals and visions. When com-
pared with earlier instances of regulatory policy under uncertainty and in sensitive sectors, however, one 
of the most notable developments in the nanotechnology case has been the absence of polarization and 
divergence of interests among groups of actors.
The role of civil society and NGOs in the debate is particularly noteworthy, especially when compared with 
their role in the GMO debate. With some notable exceptions – for instance the disruption of public debates 
in France (Nanoforum 2009) and the accusation by protesters that “nano” is “totalitarian” (McAlpine 2010) 
– civil society organizations were notable by their relatively calm and measured involvement in the debate. 
At a time when environmental and consumer NGOs were deeply occupied with the GMO case and with 
REACH, they had only very limited personnel and financial resources for nanotechnology. Friends of the 
Earth has argued that a low level of public awareness has further contributed to the fact that, “NGOs have 
had a limited impact on governance debates and regulation itself” (Miller/Gyorgy 2010: 436). Moreover, 
the European Parliament and in particular the European Greens were unusually active on nanotechnology 
and proposed many initiatives to change existing laws. With their political influence and superior financial 
and human resources, the environment committee of the Parliament appeared to at times “crowd out” 
deeper NGO involvement.
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The interests of industry actors meanwhile were very heterogeneous. On the one hand, there was – un-
surprisingly – considerable opposition to a hasty creation of new “nano law” (O’Hagan 2007). By and large, 
industry actors agreed that applying existing laws to nanotechnology applications would be the best way 
to proceed. On the other hand, there was considerable awareness that proactive regulatory policy can 
help avoid a repeat of the GMO saga and create an atmosphere of consumer trust and legal certainty. 
Downstream users of nanomaterials in the cosmetics, consumer products and food packaging industries 
were particularly supportive of precise legislation that ensures high quality of intermediate products and 
thus protects these industries from regulatory uncertainty and public concern.
The European Commission’s interests were very clear and in many cases coincided with those of the indus-
try. On the one hand, the Commission also sought to promote the successful development of nanotech-
nologies, not least because it had invested enormous resources in its development (Cordis News 2003b). 
On the other hand, however, the Commission also understood the risks of inactivity and neglect and sought 
to ensure that nanotechnologies were developed in a safe way before civil society becomes active and 
wide public concern emerges. Whether or not the Commission truly believed that stringent regulation is 
required to facilitate the commercialization of nanotechnology applications, as some Commission officials 
argued, there was considerable awareness that proactive action is required to avoid a repeat of the GMO 
controversy.
The combination of relatively little NGO involvement, considerable overlap in industry and EU interests 
towards a proactive yet measured approach and a low level of public interest goes far in explaining the 
absence of polarization. This relative convergence of interests, the institutional changes and the learning 
processes mentioned earlier explain to a large extent why nanotechnology development in Europe has 
been so fundamentally different from the experience with GMOs. It also allowed the Commission to follow 
a remarkable anticipatory approach to risk governance and avoided the situation of the GMO case where 
the Commission was forced to react to developments in Member States, often under considerable time-
pressure and with inadequate scientific and institutional capacities.
5.  Concluding Remarks
At the turn of the millennium, nanotechnologies were set to follow agricultural biotechnology down the 
road of political polarization, NGO campaigning, industry resistance and public fear. Yet, “grey goo” did 
not become the new “Frankenfoods” and nanotechnologies were developed over the past decade in an 
atmosphere of relative calm and without much controversy. This article explored the reasons for the stark 
contrast between the development of agricultural biotechnology and that of nanotechnologies. It argued 
that the sources of this different development do not relate to fundamental differences in the technolo-
gies – both lend themselves to hyperbolic claims about risks and benefits, share similarities in the structure 
of the industry, have the potential to cause ethical concerns and involve considerable uncertainty about 
risks. Instead, the underlying cause for a different development relates to the convergence of three factors 
that allowed the EU to promote a remarkably anticipatory approach to risk management: the institutional 
evolution of the EU, the convergence of interests among key stakeholders and learning processes after the 
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experience with agricultural biotechnology.
The development of nanotechnologies in Europe over the past decade presents a useful case for further re-
search. The anticipatory nature of the policy process, for instance, facilitated international cooperation by 
creating room for consultations, institutional capacity-building and inter-agency exchange. It also reduced 
the risk of regulatory fragmentation across different executive agencies and levels of government. This is 
particularly important in the complex political system of the EU where a highly politicized policy issue can 
lead to significant political frictions between individual Member States. On the other hand, the informality 
of agenda setting and the obscurity of developing regulatory processes through a relatively small group of 
experts shift the nature of regulatory policy from transparent decisions to more elusive processes.
This article provides a first introduction to and an overview of nanotechnology policy in Europe. It explores 
Europe’s evolution in managing risks under uncertainty by delineating the structural similarities and differ-
ences between agricultural biotechnology and nanotechnologies. As a constantly evolving political entity, 
the EU’s approach to risk governance also changes over time. In the case of nanotechnology policy, this 
change manifests itself in learning processes as well as new institutional structures and stakeholder prefer-
ences. It remains to be seen whether the EU’s anticipatory approach to nanotechnology risk governance 
ultimately succeeds in avoiding future public polarization and whether it can serve as a model for other 
emerging technologies that come with uncertain risks.
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